(Public, No Paywall) The Hormuz Crisis: An Alternative View
March 22, 2026
Several colleagues and clients requested translations of my Arabic columns, some written three weeks ago. Below is the translation. You may not agree. Feel free to debunk the points, mentioned, but please focus on the ideas and do not personalize.
Executive Summary
The ongoing crisis can be viewed in two main ways:
Iran and its nuclear program as the central focus of the conflict. In this narrow lens, the war revolves primarily around containing or neutralizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. If that’s the case, any impact is short-lived. Regardless, the US will benefit, even in the long term, from the closure of the Hormuz strait
Iran as one piece in a much larger geopolitical puzzle. Here, the current events fit into a broader US strategy encompassing trade wars, economic sanctions, tariffs, control over chokepoints like the Panama Canal, both ends of the Red Sea, pressures on Venezuela, interest in Greenland, and other elements. This aligns with the framework laid out in the US National Security Strategy released in November 2025. In this case, the implications extend far beyond the short term. Disruptions would reshape global economics, politics, trade patterns, and investment flows for decades, marking a truly historic realignment.
Who is responsible for closing the Strait of Hormuz?
It ultimately comes down to either the United States or Iran:
If the U.S. is orchestrating or driving events, Iran serves merely as one element—a trigger or pretext—within a much wider global strategy.
If Iran is the primary driver, then the US National Security Strategy would have to be seen as having failed outright, as it would mean the US has lost control over key escalation dynamics and failed to deter or shape outcomes in line with its stated priorities. The Strategy states:
“America will always have core interests in ensuring that Gulf energy supplies do not fall into the hands of an outright enemy, that the Strait of Hormuz remain open, that the Red Sea remain navigable, that the region not be an incubator or exporter of terror against American interests or the American homeland, and that Israel remain secure.”
Source: Kepler, March 22, 2026
Hormuz and LNG
During the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, a wave of reports emerged in major Western media outlets that focused on the possibility of Tehran closing the Strait of Hormuz, along with the severe potential impacts on global oil and gas markets, energy prices, and the broader economy. These articles rarely cited direct statements from Iranian officials threatening such a move during that specific conflict. Instead, they repeatedly echoed similar talking points and scenarios, which suggest they may have been part of a coordinated messaging or public relations effort to highlight risks and shape perceptions.
The timing of this coverage is particularly noteworthy. It coincided with East Asian buyers actively seeking partners for long-term LNG supply agreements. Many of these companies had initially planned to contract with US LNG exporters, but uncertainties stemming from President Donald Trump’s trade policies, including ongoing trade wars, repeated tariff impositions, and unpredictable shifts in approach, prompted a pivot. As a result, Asian importers increasingly turned toward more stable and reliable suppliers in the region, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to secure their energy needs.
The wave of media reports emphasizing the risk of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz during the Twelve-Day War appears to have served a specific strategic purpose: to underscore to Asian LNG buyers the vulnerability of long-term contracts with Gulf suppliers like Qatar and the UAE. By amplifying scenarios where Tehran could disrupt shipping through the strait at will, stranding massive volumes of LNG destined for Asia, the coverage sought to portray reliance on these routes as a form of geopolitical hostage-taking. This messaging implicitly pushed the narrative that US LNG offered a safer, more reliable alternative, free from such chokepoint risks. At stake were contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars over the coming decades, as Asian importers weighed commitments amid heightened regional tensions.
LNG has evolved into a core element of US foreign policy and a key pillar of national security strategy. Any significant competition to American LNG exports, whether from Russia, the Middle East, or elsewhere, is increasingly framed as a direct threat to US interests. This perspective has driven a series of aggressive measures to protect and expand the US share of key markets, particularly in Europe. Notable examples include:
Strong and sustained opposition to Nord Stream 2, the Russia-to-Germany undersea pipeline, which the US viewed as deepening European dependence on Russian gas. This opposition involved sanctions on companies involved in its construction, contributing to the project’s effective halt.
Support for Germany to build multiple LNG import regasification terminals to receive and distribute American LNG, accelerating Europe’s shift away from Russian supplies.
Imposition of broad sanctions and restrictions on new Russian LNG projects, including bans on facilities, carriers, and related transactions, aimed at limiting Moscow’s ability to expand its gas export capacity.
The sabotage of Nord Stream 1—which has never been conclusively attributed but removed a major Russian pipeline route—further reinforced this dynamic, though the incident’s origins remain shrouded in speculation and debate years later.
The cessation of Russian natural gas exports to Europe via the pipeline transit route through Ukraine at the end of 2025, following the expiration of the five-year transit agreement.
These actions collectively illustrate how the US has leveraged energy policy to counter rival suppliers, secure market access for its LNG, and align energy flows with broader geopolitical objectives.
Hormuz, Insurance, and the Media
This above introduction was necessary to understand what happened in the Strait of Hormuz after the attack on Iran started. Suddenly, emails/messages began arriving for oil and liquefied gas tankers, stating that they were from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and that the Strait of Hormuz was closed and that they could not proceed to cross it. Indeed, within hours there were no oil or liquefied gas tankers in the strait, and this continued for several hours.
There is no credible evidence that the three vessels highlighted in Western media reports, following receipt of warning messages, were deliberately targeted by Iranian forces or proxies. Two of the ships were reportedly empty, while the third was fully laden. In at least two cases, damage resulted from debris from intercepted missiles or projectiles falling onto the vessels after air defenses engaged threats in the vicinity, rather than direct hits. One of these vessels is a small tanker routinely involved in smuggling oil products between Iran, India, and other destinations. By the standards crude carriers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, it carries only a very limited quantity, typically far below the scale of legitimate commercial traffic. If any intentional action occurred against this ship, it likely stems from internal disputes within Iran’s smuggling networks, possibly involving friction between independent operators and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which oversees and profits from much of this illicit trade through various gangs and intermediaries across borders.
The core question is why Western media outlets amplified coverage of the initial small smuggling vessel, framing it as a major escalation by attacking an “oil tanker” while downplaying or omitting its role in shadow fleet operations and its modest size/cargo capacity. Similarly, reports often described one or more of the three incidents as direct “attacks” on ships, even when evidence points to near-misses or collateral effects from intercepted threats, with no confirmed strikes on the hulls in some cases. This pattern of exaggeration, scaring insurance underwriters, shipowners, and charterers into higher war-risk premiums and deterring transit, serves clear political and economic objectives. By inflating the perceived threat to commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing US-Israeli conflict with Iran, it contributes to:
Surging war-risk insurance rates
Reduced traffic through the strait, tightening global oil supply and supporting higher prices.
Justifying escalated US/allied military presence, escorts, or strikes in the region.
In short, yes—this appears to be a deliberate and coordinated exaggeration, aligning with broader efforts to pressure Iran economically, amplify the narrative of Iranian aggression, and sustain elevated energy market volatility during the conflict.
Western media outlets rapidly amplified claims that the IRGC had effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz following anonymous warning messages broadcast to vessels in the area, often via VHF radio, declaring that no ships would be allowed to pass. Headlines framed this as Iran unilaterally shutting down the strait, implying a blockade enforced without visible military force, and escalating fears of a total cutoff of roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG flows, despite the fact that most of the waterways are in Oman, not in Iran.
Subsequent reporting further alleged that the IRGC was selectively permitting only Chinese-flagged or Chinese-operated ships to transit while barring others, portraying this as discriminatory favoritism toward Beijing amid the broader US-Israeli conflict with Iran. In reality, no official Iranian government or IRGC statement has ever explicitly confirmed a full closure of the strait or a policy of allowing only Chinese vessels. The origin of the warning messages remains unverified and unknown. Two main theories circulated regarding their source:
Rogue or low-level action by elements associated with the so-called “Iranian Electronic Army” (a loose network of pro-regime cyber activists, often young supporters), acting independently without high-level authorization and underestimating the severe international backlash and economic blowback such signals could trigger.
Foreign orchestration by adversarial entities seeking to heighten market panic, disrupt shipping, and amplify perceptions of Iranian aggression for political or economic gain.
The actual driver of the near-total halt in tanker traffic through the strait was not direct Iranian interdiction or enforcement but the rapid response from European and international marine insurers. Following the messages and initial reports of threats/nearby incidents, major underwriters invoked war-risk clauses to cancel or massively hike premiums. Many policies were voided outright for the Gulf zone. Without valid war-risk coverage, mandatory under most charter parties, financing agreements, and international maritime regulations, shipowners and operators simply could not legally or commercially proceed. Hundreds of vessels anchored on both sides of the strait, stranding cargoes and crews, not because Iran physically blocked passage, but due to the insurance market’s de facto blockade.
Thus, the core disruption stems from commercial risk aversion and skyrocketing insurance costs, not from any proven Iranian naval closure or selective favoritism. The media’s emphasis on an “Iranian shutdown” and “Chinese-only access” appears to have exaggerated unconfirmed signals into a narrative of outright blockade, fueling volatility in energy prices, freight rates, and geopolitical tensions.
Who Benefits the Most from Closing Hormuz?
The core question is: Who gains from disseminating news in this manner? And why did President Trump overlook the role of insurance companies in driving up oil prices? At the time this piece was written, Qatar had announced a halt to its LNG production following Iranian attacks on its facilities amid the escalating US-Israel-Iran conflict. This has disrupted exports of oil and LNG from the Gulf region.
Who stands to benefit from this disruption in Gulf oil and LNG exports? Primarily President Trump and Vladimir Putin. The United States, as the world’s leading LNG producer, is positioned to fill the supply gap left by Qatar, boosting American energy exports and revenues.
Russia similarly benefits from higher global energy prices and reduced competition in gas markets, especially for Europe.
Who loses out? Europe faces immediate energy shortages and skyrocketing gas prices, as it has relied partially on Qatari LNG as a reliable alternative to Russian supplies. China, another major importer, will also suffer from higher costs and supply constraints in the longer term.
The harsh reality, however, is that the Gulf states themselves—along with Iraq—will bear severe negative consequences in both the short and long run, from damaged infrastructure and lost export revenues to broader regional instability.
This goes deeper than isolated events in the Gulf. Why has Trump pushed for greater US influence over navigation in the Red Sea? Why pursue control of the Panama Canal and Greenland? And why intervene decisively in Venezuela? The truth is that developments in the Gulf cannot be viewed separately from these broader strategic moves. They appear interconnected as part of a larger effort to secure key global chokepoints, energy routes, and resources, prioritizing US dominance in energy markets, trade, and geopolitics amid conflicts that reshape global supply chains.
Is Iran the target of the war, or is it a pretext for achieving major global goals?
Let’s revisit the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, when Israel launched strikes on Iran, followed by US involvement under President Trump. Official claims at the time asserted that Iran’s nuclear capabilities had been destroyed. Back then, I highlighted two key points: First, it was not in the interest of Israel, the United States, or the Iranian regime to admit the nuclear program had been eliminated. Even if the entire project had been wiped out, all three parties would insist it still existed.
This aligns precisely with what I wrote 19 years ago in my piece titled “The Iranian Nuclear Program: The Crisis That Never Ends.”
Eight months later, we see the US and Israel striking Iran again, this time under the pretext that the previous attacks failed to eliminate the nuclear program. What stands out is the remarkably rapid return to military action.
The second point concerns China’s perspective: Israel’s strikes in June 2025 caused no major concern for Beijing. However, the subsequent US strikes, combined with repeated reports in credible Western media claiming Tehran was poised to close the Strait of Hormuz, convinced China that the strait could indeed be shut down one day, and not by Iran, but by the United States, and Chian prepared for it. This is exactly what we are witnessing today.
China’s response was silent but significant. The country continued aggressively building massive stockpiles of oil, gas, coal, and virtually every other storable commodity. These preparations were clearly aimed at insulating itself against the risks of war, severe sanctions, or a major supply disruption, particularly one triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
In parallel, an old gas pipeline project between Russia and China was quietly revived. The goal was to secure a reliable overland supply of Russian natural gas. This move would serve as a critical backup if liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments from Qatar were cut off due to any closure or severe restriction of the Strait of Hormuz. These observations were written eight months ago.
The Trump administration’s true objective in the current confrontation with Iran remains unclear. The publicly stated goals have shifted repeatedly: from preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, to destroying its offensive military capabilities and blocking its development of long-range ballistic missiles, to weakening the regime enough for internal protesters to overthrow it, and even to outright regime change through military force. All of these scenarios have been analyzed in depth by specialists. They have examined the strategic and economic implications in detail, including the potential consequences for global oil and gas markets. A key focus has been the possibility of Iran attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Many experts concluded that Iran could fully close the strait only for a very short period. Virtually all analysts agree, however, that Iran, along with its regional proxies and allies, could create significant disruptions to maritime navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz without being able to achieve a complete shutdown.
Western analysts overlooked a key factor in the current disruption: the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, driven not by Iran but by actions linked to the United States. Iran has neither closed the strait nor attempted to do so, and such a move would run counter to its own interests. The sharp drop in shipping traffic through the strait stems primarily from insurance companies canceling war-risk coverage or imposing prohibitively expensive premiums. Shipowners and charterers, facing these conditions, have largely halted transits rather than risk uninsured voyages, whether this reflects direct coordination with the Trump administration or simply a market reaction to heightened tensions.
Two critical points stand out:
The trigger for these insurance cancellations and premium surges was not an event in the Strait of Hormuz or the Gulf, but a separate incident: the US submarine torpedo attack on the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean off Sri Lanka’s southern coast. The strike, which occurred as the vessel returned from naval exercises, killed dozens of Iranian sailors and dramatically escalated perceptions of global risk for maritime operations. In other words, it widened the area of the high risks beyond the insurance companies’ abilities to cover.
Notably, President Trump, who has a well-established history of publicly criticizing anything or anyone that drives up oil prices, including foreign leaders and companies, has remained silent on the insurance firms’ actions. For the first time, he has not opposed soaring oil prices or condemned the insurers’ pullback. This unusual restraint raises questions about underlying motives or alignments in the administration’s approach to the crisis.
Is Iran the target? Who Benefits the Most from Closing Hormuz?
If you assume that Iran is the target of this war and Iran it has closed the Strait of Hormuz, then the biggest beneficiaries are clearly the United States and Russia. Trump stands to gain significantly from this closure, as it advances several of his key objectives, which I outline below. Alternatively, if you view this through the lens of a broader US strategy for global dominance, where Iran serves merely as a pretext to execute a larger plan, the outcome remains similar: it fulfills the ambitions of what some call the “deep state,” as articulated in the National Security Strategy announced in November 2025.
The hallmarks of President Trump’s policy are evident in his public statements and in that National Security Strategy document. He has pursued an aggressive effort to reshape the global map of economic and political influence for the United States, using ambitious goals and unconventional tools.
One major focus has been the relocation of vital industries. Trump has prioritized bringing the manufacturing of electronic chips and semiconductors back to the United States, rather than relying on production in Asia. These sectors are seen as strategically critical for the future economy. About 35% of global helium exports go through Hormuz, mostly to Asia. Helium is essential for the making of semiconductors. To put it differently, the Asian semiconductor industry depends heavily on helium imports from Qatar. We will not see an immediate impact, but we will see it later.
He has also worked to push Asian countries, particularly major importers, toward signing long-term contracts for American LNG and increasing their purchases of US oil. The aim is to position the United States as the world’s dominant energy center and to reduce Asia’s dependence on energy supplies from the Gulf region.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz dramatically heightens the perceived risks and costs of relying on Gulf oil and LNG. This shift makes American oil and gas exports far more competitive on the global market.
Fertilizers represent another key vulnerability. Gulf countries are major exporters of fertilizers, and roughly one-third of global fertilizer exports typically passes through the Strait of Hormuz—primarily destined for Asian markets, especially India.
The problem extends far beyond mere energy exports. A halt in shipments of LNG and other liquid petroleum gases disrupts even the domestic fertilizer production in many Asian countries. Local industries in these nations rely heavily on these feedstocks to manufacture fertilizers, so any prolonged cutoff cripples their ability to produce them on a scale. This ties directly into one reason Trump imposed steep tariffs on certain Asian countries: their restrictions on imports of American agricultural products. With fertilizer shortages leading to reduced agricultural output in those markets, demand for agricultural products imports surges. This creates an opening for US agricultural goods to flood in and fill the resulting gaps, boosting American farmers and exporters.
Dominance Through Artificial Intelligence and Energy
The National Security Strategy released in November 2025 explicitly frames global dominance as hinging on leadership in artificial intelligence and secure, abundant energy supplies. Superiority in AI cannot be sustained without cheap, plentiful energy to power data centers, manufacturing, and innovation. A core Trump objective has therefore been to keep energy prices low for American companies while making them expensive for competitors. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has driven precisely this outcome: a sharp, sustained spike in global prices for oil, natural gas, and LNG. This disadvantages energy-importing rivals while enhancing the relative position of US producers. In fact, the oil price differentials alone prove this point. Prices in Asia for certain types of crude are higher than WTI by more than $70/b
To enforce control over energy flows and inflate costs for competitors, dominance over key maritime chokepoints is essential. These include the Panama Canal, the Red Sea (and its entrances like Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal), and the Strait of Hormuz itself.
The only major alternative route, the Northern Sea Passage near the Arctic, remains vulnerable without influence over Greenland, which has emerged as a strategic priority in recent discussions. In this broader context, developments in Venezuela and the hoped-for changes in Iran are interconnected elements of the same strategy, not isolated events.
In summary, the attack on Iran and the resulting disruption of the Strait of Hormuz have delivered massive strategic gains for the United States. What has unfolded represents a historic turning point—one that will reshape global economic and geopolitical alignments for decades, regardless of whether the Iranian regime survives in its current form.
Paradoxically, the regime’s continued existence may even serve US interests by justifying a permanent American military presence near the Strait, ensuring ongoing influence over the chokepoint.
Regarding Venezuelan oil, stockpiling in US ports appears designed to offset the loss of Iraqi imports caused by the Hormuz disruption (similar crude quality form a refining point of view). This suggests the closure was either anticipated well in advance or actively incorporated into planning.
Finally, Trump’s proposal to provide insurance for ships transiting the Strait, coupled with US Navy escorts, amounts to indirect American control over the waterway. This increases insurance and transportation costs permanently for energy-importing countries from Gulf states, thus raising costs for competitors.
In essence, Trump has effectively advanced the longstanding goals of the US foreign policy establishment (deep state) by capitalizing on escalating regional conflicts and international tensions. He has leveraged Iran as a justification to roll out aggressive new strategies across the Middle East. These approaches appear set to persist regardless of whether the current Iranian regime survives in its present form. With Iran’s military capabilities severely degraded, its nuclear program set back, and its regional influence curtailed through ongoing operations, the United States now occupies a significantly more dominant stance in global energy markets and advanced technology/military domains. This strengthened position allows for greater control over strategic resources and deterrence against rivals, aligning with core US interests in maintaining hegemony in the region and beyond.
While the current geopolitical and policy environment is widely expected to push the global economy toward stagflation, with elevated inflation, sluggish growth, and rising recession risks in the US, the key distinction lies in the timelines involved.
The immediate costs and economic pain are concentrated in the short term. In contrast, the benefits, including strengthened US strategic positioning in global energy markets, reduced reliance on adversarial suppliers, accelerated domestic investment in technology and manufacturing, and long-term supply-chain resilience, are largely long-term in nature, emerging over years or decades as these structural shifts take hold. This mismatch between near-term hardship and delayed gains is a classic feature of major economic realignments driven by policy or external shocks. However, this mismatch is creating confusions among experts and laymen alike. EOA