From Leverage to Dependence: Russia's Gas Sector Four Years After the Invasion
Will current Hormuz Crisis change the EU attitude toward Russian gas? (With 5 charts)
Dear Readers,
This report was originally scheduled for release about 12 days ago, but the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran starting late February 2026, followed by the ensuing Strait of Hormuz crisis, took priority in our coverage.
In light of these developments, Russian oil, natural gas, and LNG are now poised for significantly higher global demand. Russia stands to benefit from selling substantially larger volumes at much elevated prices amid the disruption.
The EU entered this period with gas storage levels already critically low— hovering near the bottom of the five-year range, 30% of capacity. With LNG shipments through the Strait of Hormuz effectively halted since early March, Qatar’s force majeure declarations, and near-total suspension of tanker traffic, the EU has limited immediate alternatives. This leaves the bloc with little choice but to ramp up imports of piped Russian gas and Russian LNG in the short term to stabilize supplies and avoid deeper shortages ahead of the next injection season. The problem is that Russia will sell to highest bidder, and Russian LNG cargos might end up in Asia instead of Europe, which might cause shortages in some EU countries.
While the Hormuz crisis may prove relatively short-lived, its ripple effects—disrupted Qatari LNG output, rerouted or delayed global energy flows, and heightened risk premiums—could persist for years or even decades, reshaping supply security perceptions. It remains uncertain whether this episode will prompt a fundamental rethink in the EU’s stance toward Russian gas imports, especially given the bloc’s recently adopted phase-out regulations (discussed below). The crisis has already sparked renewed debate on energy pragmatism versus geopolitical principles.
Additionally, the ongoing disruptions could pressure China to resolve outstanding commercial hurdles in the recent Power of Siberia-2 pipeline agreement. Pricing, take-or-pay terms, and timelines—previously unresolved—may ow face accelerated negotiations, as Beijing seeks to secure reliable non-Middle East supplies amid global LNG tightness and volatility. In an extreme scenario, the Hormuz crisis might even expedite construction decisions and financing for this major new route, further solidifying Russia’s eastward pivot.
February 2026 marks the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a conflict that has profoundly and permanently altered global natural gas and LNG trade patterns, while fundamentally shifting Moscow’s longstanding energy export strategy. For decades prior to February 2022, Russia stood as Europe’s dominant gas supplier. In 2021, Gazprom delivered approximately 140–150 billion cubic meters (bcm) of pipeline gas to the EU across multiple routes, augmented by roughly 15 bcm of LNG. Ambitious expansion plans were also underway, with targets set for LNG production capacity to reach around 100 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) by 2030.
Four years on, the landscape has changed dramatically. Russia has lost its historic preeminence in the European market, where its pipeline gas share has plummeted, while the United States has emerged as a leading supplier—often ranking as the second-largest overall provider to Europe after Norway, particularly through surging LNG volumes.
In this article, we examine the extent to which the war has reshaped Russia’s gas sector and explore the outlook for 2026–2027 amid ongoing geopolitical pressures, shifting demand, and evolving global supply dynamics.